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INTRODUCTION: THE ARBITRATION REVOLUTION
In 2013, Keeya Malone brought a wage and hour class action
against her former employer, California Bank & Trust (CB&T).1  In
response, CB&T cited three provisions in Malone’s employment
handbook.2  The first required her to arbitrate any dispute against the
company.3  The second waived her right to file or participate in a
class-wide arbitration.4  And the third was a delegation clause, which
gave the arbitrator—not a court—exclusive jurisdiction to decide the
very question of whether the arbitration clause was enforceable.5
In some ways, CB&T’s defense strategy was nothing new.  In 1925,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)6 to make arbitra-
tion provisions presumptively enforceable.7  Although lawmakers did
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law.
** Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law.
1. Malone v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241, 243–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
2. Id. at 244–45.
3. Id. at 244.
4. Id. at 245.
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 68–401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)).
7. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
457
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not intend the statue to cover employment agreements,8  the U.S. Su-
preme Court extended the FAA into the workplace in 2001,9 opening
the door for companies to funnel their nonunionized employees’
grievances outside of the judicial system.10
The privatization of employment disputes has sparked fierce de-
bate.  Some courts and scholars see arbitration provisions in employ-
ment contracts as particularly coercive.  After all, unlike consumers,
who can usually decide not to buy an item if they object to the fine
print, “few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an
arbitration requirement.”11  In addition, these critics argue that arbi-
tration’s loose procedural and evidentiary rules dilute employees’
rights, and arbitrators—who, unlike judges, bill by the hour—have fi-
nancial incentives to appease the repeat-playing employers who are in
the position to select them again in future cases.12  Conversely, propo-
8. To be sure, the statute’s centerpiece, § 2, sweeps broadly and makes arbitration clauses in
“contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce” presumptively enforcea-
ble. Id. § 2.  But before the New Deal, most employment agreements did not affect interstate
commerce.  Thus, only workers who literally moved between jurisdictions would have fallen
within § 2.  In fact, lawmakers took pains to exclude this very class of individuals, specifying in
§ 1 that the FAA did not govern “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce.” Id. § 1.  Then-Secretary of
Commerce Hebert Hoover proposed this language to assuage organized labor, which had ob-
jected to the “inclusion of workers’ contracts in the law’s scheme.”  Letter from Herbert Hoover,
Sec’y of the Dep’t of Commerce, to Senator Thomas Sterling (Jan. 31, 1923) reprinted in Sales
and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration:
Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong.
14 (1923).
9. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that § 1 only exempts
transportation workers).  A decade earlier, the Court foreshadowed this conclusion by requiring
a plaintiff to arbitrate his Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim against his employer.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (noting that the plaintiff
waived the argument that he fell within the scope of § 1’s exclusion).
10. Arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements fall under § 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).  Pub. L. 80–101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012)).
11. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000); see Ken-
neth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 255, 292–93 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Co-
ercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 134 (1996) (“A danger exists
that the decisions of some arbitrators may be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to secure
their own future employment.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 684–685 (1996);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yel-
low Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1046 n.196 (1996) (“While arbitrators
are not accountable to the public, they may be accountable to the repeat players in the arbitral
world—those who pick arbitrators on a regular basis.”); David M. Kinnecome, Note, Where
Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive Pro-
tections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REV. 745, 762 (1999); see also, e.g.,
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nents of extrajudicial dispute resolution argue that its speed, informal-
ity, and relative cheapness pave the way for employees with modest
claims.13  Seen this way, arbitration increases access to justice by cre-
ating a forum for plaintiffs who are shut out of the court system.14
But, as the arc of Malone’s lawsuit illustrates, these issues have
taken a sudden turn.  For decades, courts balanced the rival views of
extrajudicial dispute resolution by reviewing arbitration clauses for
fairness.15  For instance, California once invalidated delegation clauses
in employment contracts on the ground that arbitrators have “a
unique self-interest in deciding that a dispute is arbitrable.”16  Like-
wise, the California Supreme Court held that class arbitration waivers
could be unconscionable if they prevent employees from banding to-
gether to seek redress for many low-value causes of action.17  Re-
cently, though, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,18 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a delegation provision in the employment set-
ting.19  A year later, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,20 the
Court determined that the FAA eclipsed the California rule that ex-
Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401;
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 38.  This repeat-player
critique owes its genesis to Marc Galanter, who famously argued that parties who were regularly
embroiled in litigation enjoyed advantages that “one-shotters” did not.  Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95,
97–101 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1349–52 (1997); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–64 (2001) [hereinafter Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws]; David Sherwyn
et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing
out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73,
99–100 (1999).
14. Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra note 13, at 563. R
15. See, e.g., Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690–95.
16. Ontiveros v. DHL Exp. (USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 480–82 (Ct. App. 2008), abroga-
tion recognized by Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc. 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 159 (Ct. App. 2015).
17. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564 (Cal. 2007), abrogation recognized by Is-
kanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014) (extending Discover Bank to an
employment class action); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that class arbi-
tration waivers in consumer contracts can be unconscionable when applied to cases that “pre-
dictably involve small amounts of damages” and feature allegations that the drafter “deliberately
cheat[ed] large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money”).
18. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
19. Id. at 72.
20. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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empted numerous small-dollar claims from class arbitration waivers.21
Thus, in 2010, when CB&T fired Malone, none of its private procedu-
ral rules would have been valid.  However, by the time Malone’s case
reached the California court of appeals in 2014, the opposite was true.
Her challenge to the class arbitration waiver was almost certainly
doomed.22  And, in any event, the delegation provision required her
to address this argument to the arbitrator.23
The Court’s recent cases have deepened the rift between arbitration
skeptics and proponents.  For instance, David Schwartz has faulted
Rent-A-Center for playing ostrich with the fact that arbitrators are un-
likely to annul arbitration clauses when doing so means alienating a
repeat-playing firm and dismissing a lucrative case at its inception.24
Likewise, J. Maria Glover,25 Judith Resnik,26 and Jean Sternlight27
have argued that Concepcion liberates businesses from liability by de-
stroying incentives for plaintiffs to pursue low-value claims.  The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has declared that class
arbitration waivers in employment contracts violate the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA)28—a view that academics have em-
braced29 but courts have rejected.30  Finally, commentators have
21. Id. at 351–52.  Two years later, the Court extended Concepcion’s logic and required nega-
tive-value, federal statutory claims to be arbitrated on an individual basis. See Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
22. See Malone v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241, 253 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting that
Concepcion precluded a court from “forcing the parties to arbitrate on a class basis when they
had not agreed to do so”).
23. See id. at 254–56.
24. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239,
246–48 (2012).
25. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052, 3070–71 (2015).
26. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2893 (2015); Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78, passim (2011).
27. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Jus-
tice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 721–22 (2012).
28. The NLRA guarantees employees’ rights to engage in “concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  In D.R.
Horton, Inc., the NLRB declared that this provision invalidated a class arbitration waiver in an
employment contract.  357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 6–8, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,546 (Jan.
3, 2012), enforcement granted in part, rev’d in part by D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344
(5th Cir. 2013).  The Board recently reaffirmed this holding. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361
N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2, 2014–2015 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,878 (Oct. 28, 2014) (acknowledging the
rejection by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but, after independent reexamina-
tion, affirming D.R. Horton).
29. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Collective Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration: Impli-
cations of DR Horton and Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 179 (2014); Charles
A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted
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called for Congress to reinstitute class arbitration or ban predispute
arbitration clauses in employment contracts by passing the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2013 (AFA).31
However, the business community has rallied around the Court’s
opinions.  Members of this camp claimed that the repeat-player cri-
tique lacks empirical support.32  In addition, they argued that Concep-
cion actually benefits workers by encouraging employers to use
arbitration in the first place.
No company would willingly enter into arbitration agreements if the
price were to require class arbitration whenever an employee
claimed to be acting on behalf of a putative class.  That would harm
employees, because for the most common employment disputes—
individual claims too small to attract a contingent-fee lawyer—the
choice is ‘arbitration—or nothing.’33
Accordingly, the argument concludes that banning class arbitration
waivers or enacting the meat-cleaver AFA “would make worse off the
very people whom Congress is seeking to protect.”34
This Article, an invited contribution to the Twenty-First Annual
Clifford Symposium: The Supreme Court, Business and Civil Justice,
hosted by the DePaul Law Review, holds these competing views to the
fire by examining 5,883 matters brought by employees in the Ameri-
Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1017–18 (2013). See generally Katherine V.W. Stone,
Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164 (2013) (examining the procedural posture and history of D.R.
Horton).
30. See, e.g., D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362; Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55
(8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Iskanian
v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 142 (Cal. 2014).
31. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and
the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 468 (2011); Stern-
light, supra note 27, at 726; Imre Stephen Szalai, More than Class Action Killers: The Impact of
Concepcion and American Express on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 31, 55–56 (2014); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60
U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 793 (2012). See generally S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).  The AFA would
nullify any provision that “requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute,
antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.” Id. § 402(a).
32. E.g., Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Unfair Attack on Arbitration: Harming Consumers by
Eliminating a Proven Dispute Resolution System, in Legal Memorandum No. 97 from the Heri-
tage Foundation 10 (July 17, 2013), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/lm97.pdf.
(“Some opponents argue that arbitrators have a strong incentive to favor business clients be-
cause they are repeat players in arbitration. . . .  [H]owever, the empirical research does not
support that claim.”).
33. Brief for Amicus Curiae Cal. Emp’t Law Council in Support of Affirmance at 17,
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-55578), 2012 WL
6801859, at *17 [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae], (citation omitted) (quoting Theodore J.
St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
783, 792 (2008)).
34. von Spakovsky, supra note 32, at 11 (quotation omitted). R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL204.txt unknown Seq: 6 15-JUL-16 11:19
462 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:457
can Arbitration Association (AAA) between July 1, 2009 and Decem-
ber 31, 2013.  Our goal is to shed light on what actually happens inside
the arbitral forum after Rent-A-Center and Concepcion.35  In addition,
we expand on another article, “After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration” (“Consumer Arbitration”), which fo-
cuses on consumer cases initiated during the same period.36
We first examine filings.  We find little support for the argument
that employment arbitration creates a conduit for “individual claims
too small to attract a contingent-fee lawyer.”37  Indeed, few employ-
ees bother to arbitrate low-value complaints.  At the same time,
though, Concepcion has changed the environment in the arbitral fo-
rum.  As the class action has receded, plaintiffs have responded by
pursuing more individual arbitrations against large companies.  Al-
though this phenomenon is more acute in the consumer setting, it also
impacts firms that arbitrate both consumer and employment disputes,
increasing their fluency with the AAA process.
We then consider arbitral awards.  We find that employees “win”—
defined as recovering $1 or more—18% of matters.  These successful
plaintiffs recovered an average of $203,362, with a median of $52,129.
We then perform logit regressions to investigate the impact of several
variables on case outcomes.  We conclude that employees are less
likely to be victorious when they face a “high-level” or “super” re-
peat-playing employer (collectively “extreme repeat players”).  Con-
35. There is rich empirical literature on employment arbitration that uses data from before
the Court’s game-changing decisions.  Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts,
and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 223, 232–35 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, Statistics] (examining a range of studies that have
dates prior to 2000 as examples); see, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189–90 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, Repeat-Player
Effect] (examining a 270 case sample of awards decided under the AAA Commercial Arbitra-
tion Rules and the AAA Employment Dispute Resolution Rules);  Alexander J.S. Colvin, An
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2011) (analyzing arbitration outcomes on cases from 2003–2007); Theodore Eisenberg
& Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison,
DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 44 (conducting empirical research on the outcome of
employment disputes); Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2014) (using surveys to assess lawyers’ perceptions of how
arbitration affected their client’s claims); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical
Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003); J. Ryan Lamare & David B. Lipsky, Employment
Arbitration in the Securities Industry: Lessons Drawn from Recent Empirical Research, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 113 (2014).
36. David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study
of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 63 (2015).
37. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 33, at 17. R
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versely, we determine that a company’s status as an extreme repeat
player does not affect award amounts.  Similarly, the fact that a case
involves a “repeat pairing”—an employer that has appeared at least
once before the same arbitrator—does not influence win rates or dam-
age levels.
The Article contains two main Parts.  The first describes our dataset
and sample selection process.  The second analyzes filed and awarded
cases.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Section 1281.96 of the California Code of Civil Procedure requires
entities that offer conflict resolution services to publish data about
matters arising from employer-drafted arbitration clauses.38  This in-
formation must include the type of dispute, the claim amount, the
identity of the employer, the number of times the employer has ap-
peared before the arbitration provider, the identity of the employee’s
lawyer, the opening and closing dates, the prevailing party, the name
of the arbitrator, the arbitrator’s fees, and the amount of any award.39
Of the eight entities that are currently attempting to satisfy this man-
date,40 the AAA’s disclosures are the most complete and easiest to
use.41  Thus, like previous researchers,42 we decided to exclusively fo-
cus on cases administered by that institution.
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2015).  On its face, the statute only covers
“consumer arbitration[s].” Id. However, some of its disclosure mandates suggest that it also
extends to the employment sphere. See id. § 1281.96(a)(2) (requiring the arbitration provider to
divulge “the employee’s annual wage” if  a dispute “involve[s] employment”).  Likewise, the
California Judicial Council has interpreted the law to cover cases stemming from an “employee’s
employment or [an] applicant’s prospective employment.” ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL
ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION, STANDARD 2(e)(4) (last amended and effective
as of Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ethics_standards_neutral_arbitrators.pdf.
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.96(a)(1)–(9).
40. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Disclosures, JUDICATE W., http://judicatewest.com/Re-
sources/ConsumerArbDisclosures (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); Consumer Arbitration Disclosures,
ADR SERVICES, INC., http://www.adrservices.org/disclosure.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Con-
sumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer/
consumerarbstat (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Consumer Case Information, JAMS, http://
www.jamsadr.com/consumercases (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Disclosures, ALT. RESOL. CENTERS,
http://www.arc4adr.com/consumerreporting.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Disclosures by the
OIA, OFF. INDEP. ADMIN., http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/11/consumer-case-information/disclo-
sures-by-the-oia (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Disclosures for California Consumer Arbitrations,
RESOL. REMEDIES, http://www.resolutionremedies.com/disclosures.asp (last updated Oct. 28,
2015); NAM Disclosures for California Consumer Arbitrations, NAM, http://www.namadr.com/
consumer_cases_main.cfm (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
41. Other companies’ reports “either omit[ ] categories of information entirely or report[ ]
information inconsistently.” DAVID J. JUNG ET AL., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION
DATA IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE § 1281.96, at 1 (2013).
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Unfortunately, there are limitations to this approach.  For one, be-
cause Section 1281.96 only governs employer-promulgated arbitration
provisions, it does not cover individually negotiated contracts.  This
may be significant because scholars have suggested that wealthier em-
ployees may bring different kinds of claims and prevail more often
than their lower-income counterparts.43  Thus, our analysis only per-
tains to adhesive arbitration provisions not employment arbitration
generally.
The AAA disclosures also leave much to be desired.  Section
1281.96 does not require the organization to identify an employee’s
causes of action, report filing fees or administrative costs, or distin-
guish between compensatory and punitive damages.  Perhaps worst of
all, the AAA spreadsheet is often missing key variables.  Three thou-
sand two hundred and eighty-eight of the 5,883 entries (56%) list the
employee claim amount as zero.44  Although plaintiffs sometimes re-
quest equitable relief instead of damages, we doubt that all of the pur-
portedly nonmonetary cases have been correctly reported.  Similarly,
twenty awarded matters state that the employee was the “prevailing
party” but contain no award amount.45  We will try to be clear about
how these glitches affect our analysis.
Finally, selecting the AAA over its rival service providers might
skew our results.  To its credit, the AAA has passed due process pro-
tocols for employment cases.46  For instance, in disputes arising out of
employer-promulgated agreements, the AAA caps an employee’s fil-
ing fee at $200 and requires the company to pay the arbitrator’s com-
pensation.47  Likewise, the institution has taken pains to try to
establish a fair process for choosing an arbitrator.  Unless the parties’
contract states otherwise, the AAA sends them a list of candidates
and allows them to strike specific names.48  The institution also re-
42. E.g., Colvin, supra note 35 (using the Section 1281.96 disclosures to analyze employment R
arbitration awards filed by the AAA).
43. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 35, at 48 (suggesting that in noncivil rights disputes, R
higher-paid employees prevailed in higher rates than lower-paid employees).
44. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, AAA Employment Spreadsheet [hereinafter AAA Spreadsheet]
(on file with author).
45. Id.
46. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 6
(July 1, 2006); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 292–304 (2012).
47. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT: ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCE-
DURES 33 (Nov. 1, 2009).  The AAA’s rule is consistent with some courts that have held that
when employees assert statutory claims, companies cannot require them to pay any “type[ ] of
cost[ ] that [is] unique to arbitration.” See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000).
48. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 20. R
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quires its private judges to disclose “any circumstance likely to give
rise to justifiable doubt as to [their] impartiality or independence, in-
cluding . . . any past or present relationship with the parties or their
representatives.”49  Because not all arbitration administrators follow
these steps, the AAA may be a particularly hospitable environment
for employee claims.
We populated our dataset in the following manner.  We took the
17,638 cases in the AAA’s July 2014 report, dropped duplicate
records, narrowed the filing date to between July 1, 2009 and Decem-
ber 31, 2013, and limited the type of dispute to “employer promul-
gated employment.”  To zoom in on employees who would have been
plaintiffs in litigation, we cut all arbitrations that were not initiated by
an employee or in which the company’s counterclaim exceeded the
employee’s complaint.  Finally, we consolidated cases involving multi-
ple defendants into a single entry and eliminated files that did not
reveal the name of the employer or in which the employee’s claim
amount was missing.50
That left us with 5,883 matters.  Ultimately, 3,751 of these cases
were settled (64%), 1,082 were awarded (18%), 399 were withdrawn
(7%),51 376 were coded as impasse (6%), 262 were terminated on ad-
ministrative grounds (4%), and thirteen were dismissed on the merits
(less than 1%).
49. Id. at 21–22.
50. Our sample selection process was nearly identical to the one in Consumer Arbitration with
only one difference.  The AAA classifies consumer and employment cases by subtype.  For con-
sumer cases, these groups include “debt collection” and “standardized testing,” neither of which
seemed germane to our interest in the how the Court’s recent jurisprudence has impacted con-
sumer-plaintiff arbitration.  Thus, we limited our data to consumer cases that the AAA had
coded as “other.”  For employment matters, however, the dispute subtypes are “energy,” “finan-
cial services,” and “other.”  Because the Court’s decisions pertain to these categories equally, we
retained them all.
51. It is not clear how the AAA differentiates withdrawn cases from settled cases.
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FIGURE 1: TYPE OF DISPOSITION
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS, N=5883
Settled: 64% Awarded: 18% Withdrawn: 7%






This Part begins by parsing the full dataset of 5,883 cases for infor-
mation on how Concepcion has affected the volume and nature of em-
ployee filings.  It then considers the 1,082 awards with an eye on
repeat-player issues.
A. Filings
According to some, private dispute resolution allows low-income
workers to pursue small claims because it is “quicker, cheaper, and
more efficient” than court.52  Thus, corporations and their advocacy
groups contend that “[r]equiring class arbitration will deprive employ-
ees of those benefits by effectively shutting down arbitration.”53  In
addition, they argue that employees can pool their resources, obviat-
ing the need for formal aggregation.
Claims that might be assertable through a class action can be vindi-
cated effectively through arbitration.  Individuals filing arbitration
52. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 17 n.8, Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 533 F. App’x.
11 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-5213), 2012 WL 2366530.
53. Id.
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claims may share litigation expenses, including by hiring the same
lawyer.  Indeed, a lawyer seeking to represent employees should
have no difficulty mustering cooperation from a sufficient number
of claimants needed to make individual arbitration cost
effective . . . .54
This Section tests these arguments against the AAA data.  It begins by
summarizing our discussion of these issues in “Consumer Arbitra-
tion.”  It then explains why our skepticism about arbitration empow-
ering consumers extends into the employment milieu.
In “Consumer Arbitration,” we confirmed that consumer filings
did, in fact, increase post-Concepcion.55  After April 2011, when the
opinion came down, the average number of arbitrations commenced
by consumers more than doubled, swelling from approximately fifty-
two claims per month to 115.56  As it turned out, this dramatic in-
crease was driven by “arbitration entrepreneurs”: plaintiffs’ lawyers
who brought numerous stand-alone cases against a particular corpora-
tion.57  These flurries of claims created spikes in the monthly filing
figures and pulled up the overall post-Concepcion average.  As Figure
2 illustrates, the most extreme example occurred in October 2012,
when a single firm initiated 1,094 individual arbitrations against
AT&T Mobility LLC.58  This arbitration barrage was an outlier—in-
deed, it featured nearly as many cases as all other consumers filings in
2012 (1,162).
54. Brief for Amicus U.S. Curiae Chamber of Commerce in Support of Petitioner/Cross-Re-
spondent at 30–31, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-60031),
2012 WL 2245129.
55. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 93. R
56. Id. at 93.
57. Id. at 94.
58. Id. at 93–94, 94 fig.2A.
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Although no other corporation faced as many lawsuits, there were
similar—albeit smaller—bursts of claims against defendants, such as
AT&T Mobility, Citibank, Corinthian Colleges, Inc., Discover Bank,
Santander Consumer USA, Inc, and SLM Corporation (Sallie Mae).59
Figures 3 and 4 provide two examples of these “class action lite” cases.
FIGURE 3: CONSUMER CASES AGAINST FIGURE 4: CONSUMER CASES AGAINST
SALLIE MAE, INC. CORINTHIAN COLLEGES, INC.
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Nevertheless, we decided that these swarms of bilateral arbitrations
lacked the punch of the genuine class device.  For one, the AT&T Mo-
bility cases were unique.  Unlike most companies, the wireless goliath
goes to great lengths to encourage customers to arbitrate low-value
claims, such as promising to pay a $10,000 bonus and double attor-
59. Id. at 94–97, 39 figs.3–8.
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neys’ fees for anyone who recovers more than its last written settle-
ment offer.60  Because the company has 120,600,000 subscribers61 and
recently settled allegations by the Federal Trade Commission that it
engaged in “cramming” beginning in 2009,62 it is actually astonishing
that it was so infrequently sued.  Likewise, many of the other compa-
nies targeted by arbitration entrepreneurs went from staring down the
barrel of nationwide class actions to arbitrating several dozen cases.63
Indeed, as Figure 5A demonstrates, without the 1,094 AT&T Mobility
cases, the number of consumer filings per month increased only mod-
estly—by about an average of thirty per month—after Concepcion.64
Thus, we determined that the Court’s critics have the better argument,
and Concepcion likely shields firms from liability.
In some ways, the picture in the employment setting is even gloom-
ier.  Unlike the overall number of consumer arbitrations, which rose
slightly after Concepcion, employee cases tapered off.  To be sure, Fig-
ure 5B, which traces monthly filings in both the consumer and em-
ployment spheres, reveals some symmetry between them.  The
consumer and employee caseloads behaved similarly near the end of
2012, first increasing sharply and then beginning to fall.  In the em-
ployment sector, however, this plunge was even more pronounced.
For example, employees brought 112 actions in January 2013.  In De-
cember, they initiated only thirty-nine (39), a 65% decrease.
60. Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, http://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomer
Agreement.html#arbAgreement (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
61. AT&T 1Q2015 AT&T BY THE NUMBERS (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/2015
1004053854/http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/pdf/att_btn.pdf.
62. AT&T Refunds, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/refunds/att-refunds.  “Cramming” refers to the practice of “charg[ing] customers ad-
ditional money for services they have not asked for, such as monthly ringtone subscriptions,
wallpapers, celebrity gossip, or horoscope text messages.” How To Get a Refund for AT&T
Mobile Cramming, USA.GOV: BLOG DAILY UPDATE (Oct. 9, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://con-
tent.govdelivery.com/accounts/USAGOV/bulletins/d4c2d9.
63. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 94–97, 95–97 figs.3–8. R
64. Id. at 93–94, 94 fig.2B.
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FIGURE 5A: TOTAL NUMBER OF CONSUMER CASES FILED
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Of course, this decline in employment filings does not mean that
arbitration deters righteous claims.  Complaints may have dropped
because employers behaved lawfully.  Information from the Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on this topic is incon-
clusive.  On one hand, the EEOC received nearly the same number of
charges (a prerequisite for filing many employment discrimination
lawsuits) each year between 2009 and 2013.65  On the other hand, the
number of EEOC enforcement actions declined during the last three
years of our study, which implies that there were fewer meritorious
claims to pursue.66  In addition, companies’ internal dispute resolution
systems may resolve most employee gripes before they degenerate
into adversarial proceedings.67  These competing explanations must be
ventilated before we can draw firm conclusions.
Likewise, we are cautiously pessimistic about the notion that arbi-
tration encourages employees to file low-value claims.  Indeed, the
median damages sought in the 2,595 filings that have nonzero claim
amounts is a whopping $247,233.68  Only ninety-seven employees
(4%) demanded less than $10,000, and a mere 403 employers (16%)
sought under $50,000.69  It is possible, however, that these claim
amounts may be overinflated if plaintiffs exaggerate their damage re-
quests for strategic reasons.  This may be particularly likely under the
AAA’s rules for adhesive employment agreements because plaintiffs
pay a flat filing fee rather than one that rises with the sum in contro-
versy.70  Still, as we will discuss in more depth infra, one brightly
colored clue suggests that these claim amounts are legitimate: the
mean and median damages awards are quite high (more than $200,000
and $50,000, respectively).71  Thus, at least based on the evidence we
have, the idea that arbitration invites meager claims is hard to square
with the reality that few employees accept this invitation.
In addition, plaintiffs’ employment lawyers do not string together
related cases like consumer attorneys.  Figures 6 through 9 showcase
claims against the four most named defendants in our employment
65. Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
66. EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
67. Hill, supra note 35, at 807–08 (arguing that employment arbitration featured an “appellate R
effect” in which “the effective functioning of the employer’s in-house dispute resolution program
. . . isolates and resolves claims with merit in-house, leaving meritless claims for final appeal to
external arbitration with the AAA”); David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment
Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1586 (2005); W. Mark
C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843, 849 (2008).
68. AAA Spreadsheet supra note 44.
69. Id.
70. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 33–34. R
71. AAA Spreadsheet supra note 44.
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dataset.  Unlike the consumer arena, in which there are periodic
surges of filings by arbitration entrepreneurs, in the employment
arena, there is a more steady flow of claim activity over the sample
period.  Thus, attempts to bring class-action-style cases in arbitration
may be a consumer-only phenomenon.
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A final point of comparison is worth mentioning.  In “Consumer
Arbitration” we discovered that the individuation of disputes had a
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perverse effect.72  After Concepcion, mammoth class actions fractured
into many bilateral arbitrations.  Although many consumers (or their
lawyers) did not chase these claims into the private forum, there were
exceptions.  As a result, large firms found themselves hailed before
the AAA more frequently than before.73  More specifically, to gauge
a company’s experience with extrajudicial dispute resolution, we
plugged the number of times it appears in the 17,638-case AAA dis-
closures into a variable called “repeat-player score.”74  We found that
the median repeat-player score increased after Concepcion.75  In addi-
tion, the most active defendants—high-level and super repeat play-
ers—began to arbitrate more frequently after the Court’s decision
than before.76  Thus, we concluded that large companies were becom-
ing increasingly familiar with the specialized world of arbitration.77
We unearthed a similar—albeit milder—effect in the employment
field.  As Figure 10 reveals, the median repeat-player score of employ-
ers in the AAA has slightly increased—and occasionally skyrock-
eted—since Concepcion.78
72. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 96–97. R
73. Id. at 98–99.
74. Id. at 98.
75. Id. 98–99, 98 fig.9.
76. Id. 98–99, 99 fig.10.
77. Id.
78. Because we determine the repeat-player score retrospectively, one would not necessarily
expect the median repeat-player score to increase over time.  For example, Macy’s appears 200
times in the data.  We thus use 200 as Macy’s repeat-player score regardless of whether an em-
ployee sued the company in May 2010 or May 2013.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL204.txt unknown Seq: 19 15-JUL-16 11:19
2016] EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 475







July 09 Apr. 10 Apr. 11 Apr. 12 Apr. 13 Dec. 13
Filing Date
Vertical Line is April 2011
Similarly, although overall employment filings dropped after Con-
cepcion, the number of arbitrations against high-level and super
repeat-playing employers rose.  Figure 11 illustrates this point by trac-
ing suits over time against the ten employers in our data with the high-
est repeat-player scores.  Admittedly, this jump was not nearly as
abrupt as the one we found among extreme repeat players in the con-
sumer setting.  Moreover, as Figure 11 makes clear, the volume of em-
ployment filings against high-level and super repeat-playing
employers did not necessarily change after the Court’s opinion.  Many
companies arbitrate both consumer and employment matters, and we
include all cases in a firm’s repeat-player score.  As a result, some
companies that qualify as extreme repeat-playing employers exper-
ienced a post-Concepcion increase in arbitrations that was actually
driven by an uptick in consumer complaints.  Thus, the Court’s deci-
sion seems to have made extreme repeat-playing employers slightly
more sophisticated in the arbitral forum—at least to the extent that
they are able to draw on skills built in the consumer realm when arbi-
trating employment matters.
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FIGURE 11: TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES FILED PER MONTH
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Note: Only five (5) of the top ten (10) employment repeat-player firms have consumer
filings.
In sum, employees have filed fewer arbitrations since Concepcion.
In addition, these complaints rarely seek small amounts of money.  Fi-
nally, since the Court’s watershed decision, some extreme repeat-play-
ing employers have arbitrated more often (although most of these
have been consumer disputes).
B. Awarded Cases
This Section follows in the footsteps of previous empirical studies of
employment arbitration by examining awarded disputes.  It begins
with some caveats about the significance of case outcomes.  It then
reports our findings on win rates, damage amounts, and repeat
players.
1. Methodological Issues
For several reasons, it is unwise to use awarded matters as the
springboard for bold policy prescriptions.  For one, determining what
counts as an employee “win” can be arbitrary.  Most researchers de-
fine any matter in which the plaintiff recovers $1 or more in damages
as a “victory.”79  However, this ignores the fact that employees some-
times seek equitable relief, such as reinstatement, rather than money.
79. See, e.g., Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 208; Colvin, supra note 35, at 5. R
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And, on the flip side, it deems plaintiffs who obtain trivial sums to
have “prevailed.”
In addition, awarded cases are not a representative sample of all
disputes.  At the outset, arbitrated matters differ from litigated mat-
ters.  Certain types of claims (e.g., breach of contract) may more likely
be covered by arbitration clauses than others (e.g., employment dis-
crimination).  Likewise, particular plaintiffs, such as executives, often
negotiate their own employment arrangements and, thus, may be less
likely to end up in arbitration than blue collar workers.  These kinds
of divergences make it difficult to compare statistics from each arena.
Similarly, because most matters settle, those that end in an award
suffer from a selection bias.  In their well-known article, George Priest
and Benjamin Klein argued that parties only litigate when they cannot
agree on the probable outcome.80  In turn, because close cases will
reach the verdict stage, Priest and Klein predicted that plaintiffs
should prevail in roughly 50% of trials.81  Critically, this ratio should
not change even if the applicable rule or legal regime becomes more
proplaintiff or prodefendant.  Once the parties acclimate and adjust
their expectations, settlement will still weed out all lawsuits except for
the true nail-biters and coin flips.82  Eventually, the plaintiff win rate
will swing back to about one-half.
Nevertheless, arbitral awards may be more revealing than judg-
ments at trial.  First, the Priest–Klein theory assumes that most plain-
tiffs and defendants are capable of foreseeing the ultimate result.  This
kind of clarity may be unrealistic in the nonprecedential, confidential
universe of arbitration.  In turn, the more the parties’ expectations di-
verge, the more room there is for factors, such as the content of proce-
dural, substantive, and evidentiary rules or a decision maker’s biases,
to influence outcomes.83  Likewise, Priest and Klein base their model
on parties who have equal access to information.84  Yet if repeat-play-
ing employers can read the proverbial tea leaves in a way that one-
shot plaintiffs cannot, they will arbitrate fewer strong claims.  The re-
sult would be an employee win rate that is lower than 50%.
Accordingly, we cannot determine whether arbitration is fair simply
by tallying up victories or damage recoveries.  At the same time,
80. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 14–15, 15 fig.6 (1984).
81. Id. at 17–19, 18 fig.7.
82. Id. at 19.
83. See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 209, 212 (2014).
84. Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
493, 500 (1996).
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awards can provide valuable insight into how the process functions.
With that in mind, we now turn to our data.
2. Win Rates and Damage Amounts
Researchers find that employees achieve varying levels of success in
arbitration.  For instance, Lisa Bingham published two influential arti-
cles in the late 1990s that reported that employees “won”—recovered
$1 or more—63% and 52% of AAA cases, respectively.85  In the first
piece, Bingham determined that successful plaintiffs earned an aver-
age of $87,178 in damages;86 in the second, she put that figure at
$49,030.87  Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth T. Hill then took up the
mantle and discovered that plaintiffs prevailed in 46% of AAA mat-
ters from 1999–2000.88  Eisenberg and Hill observed that awards
ranged from an average of $30,732 to $211,720, depending on the eco-
nomic status of the plaintiff and the type of dispute.89  Notably, all
three studies included disputes rising from individually negotiated
agreements—a niche in which arbitration is less controversial.  Never-
theless, businesses and arbitration proponents trumpeted the work as
elucidating that “the assertions of many arbitration critics were either
overstated or simply wrong.”90
In 2011, Alexander J.S. Colvin published an article using an earlier
version of the same dataset that we use in this Article—AAA disclo-
sures related to employer-promulgated arbitration agreements under
85. See Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 209–10; Bingham, Statistics, supra R
note 35, at 238. R
86. Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 208–09, 209 tbl.2. R
87. Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, at 237 tbl.1.  One reason for this discrepancy may be R
that Bingham’s first study calculated the mean damages award among the universe of successful
plaintiffs, while her second piece used all plaintiffs—even those that lost and, thus, received
awards of zero.
88. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 35, at 46.  Eisenberg and Hill concluded that employees R
prevailed in 51% of noncivil rights matters, which was roughly comparable to the 57% success
rate for those lawsuits in state court. See id. at 48 tbl.1.  In turn, employees with discrimination
claims performed worse across the board, winning 26% of arbitrations, 36% of federal court
verdicts, and 44% of state court trials. See id.  However, the differences between arbitration and
federal court were not statistically significant. Id. at 48.  Finally, Eisenberg and Hill noted that
higher-paid employees enjoyed better results in arbitration than their lower-income counter-
parts. Id.
89. Id. at 49–50, 50 tbl.2.  Specifically, Eisenberg and Hill concluded that higher-paid employ-
ees won a mean of $32,500 in civil rights disputes and $211,720 in other matters, whereas lower-
income plaintiffs obtained average awards of $259,795 in civil rights cases and $30,732 in other
disputes. Id.
90. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 551
(2008) (“[M]ost of the methodologically sound empirical research does not validate the criti-
cisms of arbitration.”); Sherwyn et al., supra note 67, at 1567. R
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Section 1281.96 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.91  Colvin
reviewed 1,213 awards in cases filed between January 1, 2003 and De-
cember 21, 2007.92  He determined that employees won 260 times
(21%).93  Just looking at the subset of victorious employees, the aver-
age award was $109,858 with a median of $36,500.94  Yet pulling back
to consider all cases—including the vast majority that employees
lost—injected a slew of “zero” recoveries into the damage calcula-
tions.95  Under this rubric, the mean award fell to $23,548, and the
median (presumably) was zero dollars.96
Our results are similar to Colvin’s.  First, under the traditional con-
ception of a win as a recovery of $1 or more, employees prevailed in
193 out of 1,082 cases (18%).  Second, to include plaintiffs who ob-
tained equitable relief, we tried broadening this definition to include
both positive award amounts and cases with zero award amounts but
in which the arbitrator had designated the plaintiff as the prevailing
party.  Seen through this prism, twenty additional employees were vic-
torious, increasing the win rate to 20%.  The outcomes generated by
these divergent methods were not different enough to affect the quali-
tative results in the vast majority of our descriptive and regression
analyses.  Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, we will use the more con-
ventional definition of an employee win as an award of $1 or more for
the rest of the Article.
Switching our focus to damages, we find that in the sample of suc-
cessful employees, the mean damage amount was $203,362 with a me-
dian of $52,129.  Among all employees, including those who lost on
the merits (and, thus, recovered nothing), these figures fell to $36,274
and zero dollars.97
91. See Colvin, supra note 35, at 3. R
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. We gathered data about other facets of the arbitral process as well.  First, the mean case
length was about thirteen months.  Second, 334 employees (31%) went pro se, 114 (11%) elected
a documents-only hearing, and 287 (27%) chose to proceed by phone.  Third, the mean arbitra-
tor’s fee was $23,696, and employees paid an average of $292 of this amount.
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Do arbitrators favor repeat-playing employers?  This issue has be-
come more important since Rent-A-Center empowered arbitrators to
decide whether arbitration clauses are unconscionable.  Indeed, if pri-
vate judges are guided by their pocketbooks, then they should not be
trusted to define the very rules of the game.  Less obviously, repeat-
player questions have acquired new salience after Concepcion.  As
noted supra, large firms appear to arbitrate more individual cases now
that it is harder for consumers and employees to bring class actions.
Are these extreme repeat players able to capitalize on their experi-
ence within the arbitral forum?  This Section examines these ques-
tions.  It begins by describing the fiercely contested empirical work on
repeat players.  It then discusses our findings, first with a simple bivar-
iate approach and then with a more complex pair of regressions.
Bingham’s path-breaking study of AAA employment arbitrations in
the late 1990s piqued interest in the repeat-player advantage.  Survey-
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL204.txt unknown Seq: 25 15-JUL-16 11:19
2016] EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 481
ing 270 awards, she determined that employees prevailed 71% of the
time and recovered an average of 48% of their requested damages
against nonrepeaters.98  Conversely, employees won 16% of cases and
received 11% of what they sought against repeat players.99  In a com-
panion piece, Bingham analyzed 203 disputes and again found that
plaintiffs were successful in 67% of the cases against one-shot firms
but in merely 23% of cases versus repeaters.100
Rather than blaming this dichotomy on arbitrator self-interest,
Bingham acknowledged that it could stem from several factors.  For
one, she opined that the kinds of lawsuits employees bring against re-
peat players might differ from those that employees assert against
one-shotters.101  Specifically, she noted that many claims against re-
peat players seemed to rise from personnel manuals rather than indi-
vidually negotiated contracts.102  In turn, because personnel manuals
give employers greater rights, it might be more difficult for an em-
ployee to prove wrongful discharge in the shadow of such a docu-
ment.103  Likewise, Bingham hypothesized that employers might have
access to better counsel or simply “learn to settle the cases they other-
wise would lose.”104
Bingham then located cases in which a company appeared at least
twice before the same arbitrator (repeat pairings).105  She uncovered
twenty of these disputes and observed that employees won five
(25%).106  On the other hand, when there was no repeat pairing, em-
ployees prevailed eighty-six out of 155 times (55%).107  Bingham
therefore concluded that “[e]mployees lose more frequently when the
arbitrator is one the employer has used at least once before.”108  Yet
she was also careful to note that because most repeat pairings rose
from personnel manuals, it was unclear whether the root of the prob-
lem was arbitrator bias or the prevalence of weaker claims.109
98. Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 209 tbl.2, 210 tbl.3. R
99. Id. at 209 tbl.2, 210 tbl.3, 213.
100. Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, at 238 tbl.2.  Bingham also noted that employees pre- R
vailed in only five of the twenty cases (25%) when the employer had used the same arbitrator
before. Id.
101. Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 213. R
102. Id.
103. Id. Bingham later confirmed that employees won only thirteen out of sixty-one (21%)
cases stemming from a personnel manual, compared to seventy-five out of 109 (69%) matters
that arose from a negotiated contract.  Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, at 239 tbl.4. R
104. Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 214. R
105. Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, at 238 tbl.3. R
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 238.
109. Id.
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Bingham’s work sparked considerable discussion.  Some judges,
scholars, and even the EEOC, cited it as proof that “the more fre-
quent a user of arbitration an employer is, the better the employer
fares in arbitration.”110  However, other commentators faulted her for
using such a small sample size111 and for “not control[ling] for some
rather obvious variables that may explain positive employer out-
comes, such as the size of the employer.”112  In addition, David
Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, and Michael Heise argued that Bingham
had defined “repeat player” incorrectly.113  According to these au-
thors, Bingham should not have counted the first matter involving a
firm that later became a repeat player.114  They contended that the
arbitrator in Case 1 could not have known that the same entity would
return in Case 2 and, thus, had no reason to cozy up to it when resolv-
ing Case 1.115
Yet Colvin echoed Bingham’s findings in his 2011 article.116  Colvin
found that the employee win rate was 32% against one-shotters but
just 17% against repeat players.117  He then examined repeat pairings.
No matter whether he used Bingham’s or Sherwyn, Estreicher, and
Heise’s definition of repeat player,118 employees were less successful
when their opponent had previously appeared before the same deci-
110. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, POLICY STATEMENT ON
MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDI-
TION OF EMPLOYMENT (1997) (citing Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Effect of Re-
peat-Player Status, Employee Category and Gender on Arbitration Outcomes (on file with
author)); See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) (citing Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35) (relying on Bingham’s study for the R
proposition that arbitration “reduces the size of the award that an employee is likely to get,
particularly if the employer is a ‘repeat player’ in the arbitration system”); Lewis L. Maltby,
Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 34
(1998) (citing Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra, note 35, at 209–10) (opining that Bingham R
found “employees fared very poorly” in cases against repeat players).
111. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 90, at 566 n.84; Sherwyn et al., supra note 13, 144 (citing R
Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35). R
112. See, e.g., Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws supra note 13, at 566; see also Hill, supra note R
35, at 807–08 (arguing that the higher repeat-player win rate stems from an “appellate effect” in R
which an employer’s in-house dispute resolution system resolves meritorious cases, resulting in
“an AAA docket of meritless claims against that company, virtually all of which end up being
dismissed”).
113. Sherwyn et al., supra note 67, at 1570. R
114. Id.
115. Id. (“[H]ow did the arbitrator who decided in favor of the employer in the employer’s
first case know that this large employer would be a repeat player while other large employers
would not?”).
116. Colvin, supra note 35, at 13 tbl.3. R
117. Id.
118. Colvin defended Bingham’s technique, arguing that crooked arbitrators could intuit in
Case 1 that a large company might eventually be hunting for a favorable decision maker in Case
2 and beyond:
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sion maker.119  Under both methodologies, employees recovered dam-
ages 23% of the time when there was no repeat pairing but 12% of the
time when there was a repeat pairing.120  The average award was also
smaller in the latter cases: down from $27,039 to $7,451 under Bing-
ham’s method and decreasing from $25,865 to $3,009 under Sherwyn,
Estreicher, and Heise’s method.121  Colvin then performed regressions
using employee win rates and award amounts as dependent variables,
as well as repeat employer, “repeat-employer–arbitrator pairing” and
employee self-representation as independent variables.122  Using a
logit model, he determined that a business’s repeat-player status re-
duced the likelihood of an employee victory by about 49% (p <
0.01).123  He reached a similar conclusion about repeat pairings, which
lowered the odds of a plaintiff win by 40% (p < 0.05).124  Finally, using
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, he determined that em-
ployees could expect substantially lower damages in cases with repeat
players (p < 0.01) and repeat pairings (p < 0.05).125
How do our results stack up?  We first report bivariate statistics to
lay the foundation for our regression analysis in Part III.B.3.ii.
[M]y view is that in selecting an arbitrator a second and subsequent times, the employer
will take into consideration the arbitrator’s decision in the initial case involving the
employer.  From the arbitrator’s side, if there is a temptation to be biased toward an
employer in hopes of obtaining future arbitration business, the arbitrator can signal this
to the employer by more employer-favorable decision making in the initial case for
which the arbitrator is selected.  Thus, if there is a repeat-employer–arbitrator bias, it
should be manifested in more favorable decisions toward employers in the first as well
as subsequent cases involving a repeat-employer–arbitrator pairing.
Id. at 13–14.  Perhaps for this reason, Colvin uses Bingham’s technique to calculate the overall
difference in win rates and damage awards between repeat players and one-shotters.  Id. at
12–13 (defining “repeat player” as “any employer with more than one case in the data set”).
However, Colvin only employs Sherwyn, Estreicher, and Heise’s definition when examining the
more nuanced issue of repeat-player–arbitrator pairings. See id. at 13–14.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id.
122. See Colvin, supra note 35, at 17–18. R
123. Id. at 18, 19 tbl.7.
124. Id.
125. Id. Colvin obtained this result by considering all awarded cases, including recoveries of
“zero damages.” Id. at 20.  He acknowledged that this approach might conflate the threshold
matter of whether employees win with the secondary issue of how much they win. Id. Thus, he
also analyzed the impact of repeat player and repeat-player–arbitrator pairings on award
amounts in the narrower band of disputes that culminated in an employee victory. Id. at 19 tbl.7.
In this subset, he determined that employees recovered lower damages if they were self-repre-
sented (p < 0.01) or if they encountered a repeat-player–arbitrator-pairing (p < 0.10). Id. Fi-
nally, the fact that an employee was self-represented did not affect her chance of prevailing on
the merits but was meaningfully linked to lower damages in both all awarded cases (p<0.01) and
employee victories (p < 0.05). Id. at 18–20, 19 tbl.7.
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i. Bivariate Analysis
Our data on awarded cases contain several points of interest.  First,
the vast majority of employees (72%) went up against a repeat player.
This cohort prevailed just 16% of the time, which was a statistically
significant difference from the 23% win rate against one-shot compa-
nies (p < 0.05). (Table 3A).
TABLE 3A. REPEAT PLAYER PREVALENCE
Win Rate #1 Award Amount Number Percent of
Sample
Mean Mean
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Employees facing a one-shot 0.225 63,439.19 293 27.51%
defendant (0.024) (34,575.16)
Employees facing a repeat- 0.161* 25,030.05 772 72.49%
player defendant (defined as (0.013) (4,990.90)
a defendant that appeared in p=0.0139 p=0.0920
arbitration at least twice)
Total 1,065
Note:  We used t-tests to test for significant differences in win rates and award amounts
between employees who face one-shotters and employees who face repeat players.  For these
tests, significance levels are denoted in the following conventional way:  *p < 0 .05, **p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
Second, 17% of cases featured a repeat pairing; however, employees
in these matters suffered neither a win-rate nor an award-amount
penalty as illustrated in Table 3B.
TABLE 3B. REPEAT-EMPLOYER–ARBITRATOR PAIRING
PREVALENCE
Win Rate #1 Award Amount Number Percent of
Sample
Mean Mean
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Employee not facing a 0.1701 35,865.12 876 82.95%
repeat pair (0.0127) (12,048.32)




Note:  We used t-tests to test for significant differences in win rates and award amounts
between employees who face one-shotters and employees who face repeat players.  For these
tests, significance levels are denoted in the following conventional way: * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Third, plaintiffs who were pro se won just 7% of matters, whereas
those with one-shot lawyers prevailed 19% of the time (p < 0.001) and
those lucky enough to hire repeat-playing counsel were victorious in
28% of matters (p < 0.001).  Likewise, plaintiffs with one-shot and
repeat-playing lawyers enjoyed a statistically significant boost in
award amounts relative to employees who were pro se Table 3C.
TABLE 3C. PLAINTIFFS’ REPEAT-PLAYING-LAWYER PREVALENCE
Win Rate #1 Award Amount Number Percent of
Sample
Mean Mean
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Employee is pro se 0.0689 2,121.50 334 31.42
(0.0139) (783.87)
Employee has one-shot 0.1901*** 59,476.51* 384 36.12
lawyer (0.0200) (26,886.87)
(t-test compares employees
with one shot lawyers to p=0.0000 p=0.0471
pro se employees.)
Employee has repeat-player 0.2754*** 44,183.09*** 345 32.46
lawyer (0.0241) (9,562.84)
(t-test compares employees
with repeat-player lawyers p=0.0000 p=0.0000
to pro se employees.)
Total 1,063
Note:  For t-tests, we denoted significance levels in the following conventional way:
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Finally, and most surprisingly, although there was no repeat pairing
effect on the defense side of the lectern, plaintiffs’ lawyers performed
better by every metric when they had encountered the same arbitrator
at least once before (Table 3D).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL204.txt unknown Seq: 30 15-JUL-16 11:19
486 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:457
TABLE 3D. PLAINTIFFS’ LAWYER–ARBITRATOR REPEAT PAIRING
PREVALENCE
Win Rate #1 Award Amount Number Percent of
Sample
Mean Mean
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Employee is pro se 0.0689 2,121.50 334 31.66
(0.0139) (783.87)
Plaintiff’s lawyer has not met 0.2016*** 48,920.08* 635 60.19
arbitrator in arbitration (0.0159) (16,622.92)
before
(t-test compares employees p=0.0000 p=0.0416
whose lawyer has not
previously met the
arbitrator before to pro se
employees.)
Plaintiff’s lawyer has met 0.4070*** 32,401.29*** 86 8.15
arbitrator at least twice in (0.0533) (10,475.92)
arbitration
(t-test compares employees p=0.0000 p=0.0000
whose lawyer has
previously met the
arbitrator before to pro se
employees.)
Total 1,055
Note:  For t-tests, we denoted significance levels in the following conventional way:
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
ii. Regression Analysis
This Section excavates deeper by conducting two regressions.  The
first focuses on the effect of a company’s repeat-player status on em-
ployee win rates.  The second probes that variable’s influence on
damages.
In “Consumer Arbitration,” we attempted to add nuance to Col-
vin’s baseline regression model.126  First, Colvin,127 like previous re-
searchers,128 defined repeat player in a strictly binary fashion: either
an entity appeared one time in the dataset (making it a one-shotter)
or it surfaced two or more times (a repeat player).  But, arguably, the
gulf between tiers of repeat-playing firms is just as important as the
threshold distinction between repeat players and one-shotters.  Thus,
we classified defendants by sophistication quintiles: one-shotters, low-
126. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 111–13, 112 tbl.7. R
127. Colvin, supra note 35, at 13–16. R
128. Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note 35, at 207; Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, R
at 223.
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level repeat players, mid-level repeat players, high-level repeat play-
ers, and super repeat players.129  In addition, commentators have sug-
gested that plaintiffs can level the playing field by hiring counsel who
are also familiar with the extrajudicial forum.130  Thus, we labeled
consumers as either pro se, represented by one-shot attorneys, or in
the hands of low-level, mid-level, or high-level repeat-playing advo-
cates.131  Finally, we replaced the single repeat pair dummy (reflecting
whether an arbitrator–business pair had ever met before) with a series
of arbitrator–business repeat-pair dummy variables (reflecting four
levels of pair familiarity: none, low, medium, and high).  We con-
cluded that consumers who faced one-shot companies won more often
and paid less in damages relative to their counterparts who faced high-
level and super repeat-playing firms.132  Counterintuitively, we also
found that consumers who were represented by the upper tiers of re-
peat-playing plaintiffs’ lawyers—the arbitration entrepreneurs who
filed class-action-style cases—had lower win rates and award amounts
than pro se consumers.133  Accordingly, we concluded that Concep-
cion had not only insulated big companies from aggregate liability but
magnified their advantage within arbitration.
We further refine our method here.  We start by adding various
levels of plaintiffs’ lawyer–arbitrator repeat pairings to the mix (rather
than just examining various levels of employer–arbitrator repeat pair-
ings).   We also add a range of control variables, including: (1) claim
amount; (2) time between filing and hearing; (3) time between hearing
and decision; (4) dispute subtype (either energy, financial, or other
industry); (5) whether the arbitration took place in the employee’s
home state; and (6) whether the employee elected a telephonic hear-
ing or an in-person hearing.  We use a logit model and an OLS model
to investigate the effect of repeat players on employee win rates and
the square root of employee damage recoveries, respectively.134
We present our logit results in Table 4, which shows that an em-
ployer’s status as a high-level or super repeat player reduces the likeli-
hood of a plaintiff victory in a statistically significant manner.
Specifically, the logit coefficients corresponding to the high-level re-
129. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 110–13, 112 tbl.7. R
130. See, e.g., Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra note 13, at 566; W. Mark C. R
Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 74–75 (2007).
131. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 110–13, 112 tbl.7. R
132. Id. at 114 tbl.8.
133. Id. However, we also discovered that the win-rate results were a product of a single law
firm that apparently files waves of meritless arbitrations against defendants. See id. at 119–20.
134. The functional forms for our logit and OLS models appear in Horton & Chandrasekher,
supra note 36, at 107–08. R
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peat-player effect and the super repeat-player effect are -0.852 and
-0.878, respectively, with related odds ratios of 0.426 and 0.416.  These
numbers imply that employees who square off against one of these
elite firms have win probabilities that are about 58% lower
(1 – 0.42 = 0.58) than employees that face one-shotters (p < 0.05).
Thus, just as in the consumer context, employers that arbitrate the
most outperform other firms.
TABLE 4. THE EFFECT OF REPEAT PLAYERS ON WIN RATES
Consumer Win






(Reference Category Is Consumers Facing One-Shot Employer)
Low-level Repeat Player -0.218
(0.244)
[0.804]
Mid-level Repeat Player -0.126
(0.250)
[0.882]
High-level Repeat Player -0.852**
(0.321)
[0.426]




(Reference Category is Employees Facing Non-Repeat Pairs)
Low-level Repeat Pairs -0.241
(0.363)
[0.786]
High-level Repeat Pairs 0.485
(0.487)
[1.625]
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Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Sophistication




Low-level Repeat-Player Lawyer 0.918*
(0.363)
[2.504]
Mid-level Repeat-Player Lawyer 1.195***
(0.358)
[3.302]




(Reference Category Is Employees Whose Lawyer and Arbitrator Are Unfamiliar)
Low-level Repeat Pairs 0.700
(0.456)
[2.013]











Time from Filing to Hearing (in years) 0.727
(0.484)
[2.068]
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(1) Decision-month fixed effects as well as decision-year fixed effects are included.
(2) In our sample, ninety-two cases are document-only cases.  In all ninety-two of these cases,
the employee lost, so the documents-only dummy variable ends up predicting non-wins
(or failures) perfectly, which makes the logit model inestimable.  We therefore dropped
the documents-only dummy variable and the ninety-two documents-only cases from the
logit regression.
(3) In our sample, there were also fifteen observations in which the employees arbitrated
against CLS Transportation of Los Angeles, LLC and were victorious.  To control for the
fact that being involved in the CLS litigation strongly increased win probability, we
initially included a CLS variable.  However, as with the documents-only variable, the CLS
variable perfectly predicted wins, again making the logit model inestimable.  We therefore
dropped the CLS dummy variables as well as the fifteen CLS cases.
(4) Standard errors are clustered at the employer level.
What causes this extreme repeat-player phenomenon?  One
possibility is that arbitrators intentionally cater to large companies to
try to obtain future business.  However, if this were true, we would
expect to find a repeat-pairing effect: employers would prevail more
when they encountered the same self-serving arbitrator again.  But as
in “Consumer Arbitration,” we find that repeat pairing does not
impact win rates.135
How does this square with Bingham and Colvin, both of whom
determined that employers won more often when they encountered a
familiar arbitrator?136  Perhaps differences in our sample period are
the culprit.  Likewise, the divergence could flow from the fact that we
define “repeat pair” differently than Bingham and Colvin.  We coded
a case as a “repeat pair” if a company had appeared before the same
arbitrator at least once in the 17,638-case AAA disclosures, which
include both consumer and employment disputes.  Conversely,
135. The fact that a case involves a repeat pairing between a plaintiffs’ lawyer and an
arbitrator, which we examine for the first time in this Article, is also irrelevant to win rate
probabilities.
136. See Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, at 238; Colvin, supra note 35, at 17–18.
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Bingham and Colvin looked exclusively at businesses and arbitrators
who had met in previous employment matters.137  Finally, what seems
like a repeat pairing effect in Bingham and Colvin’s work might be a
result of the fact that they do not control for tiers of employer
sophistication.  Because high-level and super repeat players arbitrate
more frequently, they are more likely to be embroiled in repeat
pairings.  For instance, in our regression sample of 928 cases, only
19.7% (155/784) of employees not facing a repeat pair faced an
extreme repeat player.  In sharp contrast, for employees facing a
repeat pair, the chance of also encountering an extreme repeat player
was 56.9% (82/144).  Thus, the dominance of high-level and super
repeat-playing firms could easily be mistaken for evidence that
employers win more in repeat pairings.  In fact, in our regression, we
find that controlling for repeat pairings (both business repeat pairings
and lawyer repeat pairings) with simple zero-one dummy variables but
omitting all other repeat-playing dummies and controls reveals a
negative and (almost) statistically significant (p < 0.073) impact on win
rate.  This indicates that the repeat-pairing effect is a signal that
appears if one treats “repeat player” as a monolithic concept but
vanishes when one controls for various tiers of repeat playing.
Accordingly, we find no evidence of arbitral bias.
Alternatively, case selection might explain the extreme repeat-
player effect.  Some commentators have hypothesized that serially
arbitrating companies will boast higher win rates because they settle
more often than other defendants.138   This would be consistent with
the Priest–Klein model: if a business is eager to sort things out in-
formally, only especially weak claims will survive until the award
stage.  Yet our data reveals that high-level and super repeat players
resolved fewer disputes before the arbitrator ruled than one-shot
firms.139   Indeed, 68% of high-level repeaters and 68% of super-
repeaters terminated cases prior to an award as compared to 74% of
one-shotters (both p < 0.01).  This is precisely the opposite of what
one would expect: extreme repeat players both fully prosecute more
disputes and prevail more often.
Likewise, “Consumer Arbitration” considered the possibility that
the extreme repeat player effect rose from plaintiffs’ strategic
137. See Bingham, Statistics, supra note 35, at 236; Colvin, supra note 35, at 4.
138. See, e.g., SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION: BEFORE THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 82 (2009); Bingham, Repeat-Player Effect, supra note
35, at 214.
139. Like the Searle Report, we include both settled and withdrawn cases in this calculation.
As noted supra note 55, the AAA seems to use these labels interchangeably.
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behavior.  As we mentioned in that Article, some high-level and super
repeat players in the consumer setting will pay $7,500 to any customer
who recovers more in arbitration than the company offers to settle the
claim.140   These bonuses encourage consumers to bring low-value
grievances and prosecute them to completion.141   In turn, this might
cause arbitrators to rule on a higher number of anemic claims,
depressing the consumer win rate.142   But if this were the root of the
extreme repeat-player effect, then, presumably, we would not find
that high-level and super repeat-playing employers outperform their
one-shot counterparts.  Indeed, no extreme repeat-playing employer
of whom we are aware pays a bounty to victorious employees.  Thus,
the persistence of the repeat-player effect in the employment milieu
undercuts the idiosyncratic incentives story in the consumer sphere.
Finally, several other findings relating to win rates are noteworthy.
First, recall that “Consumer Arbitration” reached the seemingly
backwards conclusion that repeat-playing plaintiffs’ lawyers actually
achieve lower levels of success.  We did not discover this anomaly in
the employment data.  To the contrary, employees reap the rewards of
legal representation.143  Measured against the baseline of pro se
plaintiffs, the odds of employees prevailing increase when they hire
one-shot counsel, low-level repeat players, or mid-level repeat players;
all three increases are statistically significant.  Second, our control
variables reveal that some features of arbitration are plaintiff-friendly
whereas others are not.  Specifically, we determined that telephonic
hearings are associated with lower win rates than in-person hearings
(p < 0.01).  On the other hand, a longer disposition time is positively
related to an employee’s probability of winning (p < 0.01).
When we shift our focus from win rate to damage amounts (Table
5), we find that the disadvantages of going up against a high-level or
super repeat player disappear.  Our OLS estimates indicate that
employees that arbitrate against repeat-playing employers suffer no
damages penalty relative to employees that take on one-shot
employers.  There is, however, a statistically significant awards benefit
to hiring a repeat-playing plaintiff’s lawyer as opposed to proceeding
pro se.  Finally, repeat pairings do not impact damages, and telephonic
140. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 36, at 122.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. High-level repeat playing plaintiffs’ lawyers had lower win rates; however, as we
mentioned supra, this result stemmed from a single outlying law firm. Yet, we also found that
mid-level repeat-playing plaintiffs’ lawyers obtained lower damage recoveries than pro se
consumers—a result that is harder to explain. See id. at 119-20.
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hearings (p < 0.05) and longer decision times (p < 0.05) are associated
with more favorable damages recoveries.
Overall, it seems that employees fare better than consumers, at
least when it comes to repeat-player issues.  In the consumer context,
having a highly experienced lawyer or going up against a highly
experienced business disadvantages consumers both in terms of win
rates and damage awards.  However, in the employee context, having
a seasoned plaintiffs’ lawyer boosts both win rates and damage
amounts.  Moreover, employees only suffer a win rate disadvantage
when countering an extreme repeat-playing employer not a damages
disadvantage.
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TABLE 5. EFFECT OF REPEAT PLAYERS ON EMPLOYEE
AWARD AMOUNTS
(1) (2)
Square Root of Award Square Root of Award
Amounts Amounts
OLS Regression OLS Regression
(Clustered Standard Errors) (Clustered Standard Errors)
(Winners’ Sample) (Sample with All
Employees)
Employer Sophistication
(Reference Category Is Consumers Facing One-Shot Businesses)
Low-level Repeat Player -3.708 -20.228
(56.459) (19.488)
Mid-level Repeat Player 30.819 -10.554
(55.114) (20.809)
High-level Repeat Player 61.530 -29.690
(61.253) (17.551)
Super Repeat Player 97.860 -23.844
(139.134) (16.706)
Employer–Arbitrator Familiarity
(Reference Category Is Consumers Facing Non-Repeat Pairs)
Low-level Repeat Pairs -23.977 -3.708
(86.135) (15.590)
High-level Repeat Pairs -74.107 11.027
(87.384) (12.643)
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Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Sophistication
(Reference Category is Pro Se Consumers)
One-Shot Lawyer 158.084* 38.680***
(61.904) (11.056)
Low-level Repeat-Player 79.182 31.892
Lawyer
(84.692) (20.014)
Mid-level Repeat-Player 238.234** 71.589**
Lawyer
(72.969) (24.742)




(Reference Category Is Employees Whose Lawyer and Arbitrator Are Unfamiliar)
Low-level Repeat Pairs -108.558 -11.530
(75.658) (22.784)
High-level Repeat Pairs 103.676 95.693
(112.297) (59.539)
Other Controls
Consumer Claim Amount 9944.574 332.389
(in hundred millions)
(5788.591) (452.755)
Telephonic Hearing 20.779 -35.924*
(80.563) (16.125)
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-109.773 15.466Time from Filing to
Hearing (in years)
(68.477) (19.161)
Time from Hearing to -18.584 34.847*
Decision (in years)
(64.793) (16.155)
Energy Dispute 235.028 9.087
(188.732) (36.072)
Financial Dispute -76.865 23.672
(142.497) (12.324)







(1) Decision-month fixed effects as well as decision-year fixed effects are included.
(2) In logit win rate regression, we dropped ninety-two cases that were document-only cases.
To be consistent in our OLS damages regression, we also drop these ninety-two cases.
(3) In logit win rate regression, we dropped fifteen cases in which the employees arbitrated
against CLS Transportation of Los Angeles, LLC.  To be consistent in our OLS damages
regression here, we also dropped these fifteen cases.
(4) Standard errors are clustered at the employer level.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts and scholars disagree over whether the Court’s recent FAA
decisions are good for employees.  By reviewing four-and-a-half years’
worth of AAA employment arbitrations, we have tried to offer pre-
liminary answers to some of the hot-button empirical questions that
underlie this debate.  Our major conclusions are that: (1) employee
claims have declined since Concepcion; (2) few employees pursue low-
value cases; (3) the mere fact that an employee faces an extreme re-
peat-playing company decreases the odds of winning by a statistically
significant degree but does not affect damages; and (4) employees fare
just as well in repeat pairings as they do when the employer and the
arbitrator have not crossed paths before.
